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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KYLE JOSEPH LEHMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
/ 
Case No. 20030554-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his sentence to two consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen 
years entered pursuant to guilty pleas to two counts of sexual abuse of a child, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Should this Court assume that the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating 
factors when it sentenced a sex offender with a ten-year history of abusing children to 
consecutive prison terms, where the imposition of consecutive terms only increased the 
minimum term from one year to two years? 
A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 8,40 P.3d 626. "An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to 
consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quotations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal requires the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003), attached 
as Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In two separate cases, defendant pled guilty to one count each of sexually abusing a 
child (R552. 34-41, 43-44 63; R394. 34-43, 65). After reviewing the Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSI), the court sentenced defendant, in a joint sentencing hearing, to 
two consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years (R552.45-46,64:3; R394.44-45,66:3). 
Defendant timely appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 
him to serve his sentences consecutively rather than concurrently (R552. 47; R394. 46). 
Aplt. Br. at 10. This Court consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal (R394. 62).] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
When defendant was thirteen, he tried to have anal intercourse with his eight year-old 
foster brother (R552.62A:2,10). During that same time, he sexually abused his six year-old 
1
 The State will follow defendant's format in citing to the separate records. See Aplt. 
Br. at 2, n.l. Citations to the record in district court case number 031901552 will begin 
"R552," and citations to the record in district court case number 031901394 will begin 
"R394." The district court held joint change of plea and sentencing hearings, so the State 
will only cite to the transcripts from district court case number 031901552, which are twR552. 
63" and "R552. 64," respectively. 
2
 The facts are taken primarily from the PSI, which the trial court reviewed before 
sentencing defendant (R552. 64:1). Defendant offered no corrections to the PSI (R552. 
64:2). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (2003) ("If a party fails to challenge the 
accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be 
considered to be waived.") 
2 
foster sister over a four-month period by fondling her, performing oral sex on her, and 
digitally penetrating her (R552 62A:2,10). Defendant spent his subsequent teenage years in 
several residential facilities (R552. 62A:2, 8, 10). He was twice removed from residential 
facilities for "sexually acting out" with other residents (R552. 62A: 10). The second episode 
resulted in defendant's placement in a "lockdown facility" (R552. 62A:10). One of the 
episodes resulted in a referral to juvenile court for sexual abuse (R552. 62A:7). 
Although defendant, now twenty-four, has aged, his victims have not (R552. 62A: 1-
2). In September 2002, defendant molested his step-nieces, five-year-old S.H., and four-
year-old CM. (R552. 62A:3-6). The abuse occurred at C.M.'s house while other adults were 
home (R552. 62A:3-6). Defendant took both girls into a room, showed them his penis, and 
made them touch it (R552. 62A:3-4, 6). He then vaginally penetrated both girls with his 
finger (R522. 62A:3-4, 6). C.M.'s fourteen-year-old cousin, R.H., witnessed defendant 
fondling S.H. (R552. 62A:6, 11). 
Later in the month, defendant again molested S.H. in her home (R552. 62A:3-4, 6). 
Defendant made her touch his erect penis (R552. 62A:4). He then vaginally penetrated her 
with his finger and performed oral sex on her (R522. 62A:4, 6). He also made her perform 
oral sex on him, after which he ejaculated (R552. 62A:4, 6-7). 
Kristie Greene of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) reported that she 
has "rarely seen a perpetrator so adept and brazen at drawing his victims away from people 
and engaging them in in-depth sexual behavior knowing there were other people in the home 
and even on the other side of the door" (R552. 62A:11). She concluded from defendant's 
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actions that he is a "more advanced" perpetrator and that his behavior would likely continue 
absent intervention (R552. 62A: 11). 
Defendant said he molested the girls because he "believed that [he] could get away 
with it" (R552. 62A:7). When the police and his father first confronted defendant about the 
abuse, he denied it (R552. 62A:4, 7). Defendant also denied sexually abusing anyone in his 
youth (R552. 62A:4). Defendant later admitted the behavior and gave Adult Probation and 
Parole (AP&P) a full account of the abuse (R552. 62A:6-7). 
After the State formally charged defendant with two counts of sexual abuse of a child, 
a psychologist interviewed defendant to evaluate his amenability to pre-trial release (R552. 
23-24). The psychologist recommended supervised release noting that defendant had not 
been implicated in any new cases since molesting S.H. and CM. and that defendant's last 
involvement in child sex abuse was nine years previous to the current charges (R552.23-24). 
The psychologist specifically noted, however, that he did not consider defendant's juvenile 
record in assessing the risk of pre-trial release, because defendant's juvenile BCI rap sheet 
was blank (R552. 23).3 
Defendant pled guilty, and the court ordered a PSI (R552.43). AP&P prepared a PSI 
that included an official summary of the offenses, defendant's version of the offenses, 
defendant's criminal history including his juvenile record, defendant's personal history 
including his family history, sexual history, and sexual treatment history, and an evaluative 
The psychologist's source for defendant's juvenile record was apparently defendant 
himself and the DCFS reports included in pre-trial discovery. 
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assessment. The PSI recommended that the court order defendant to serve consecutive 
prison terms in the Utah State Prison (R552. 62A: 1). In recommending consecutive prison 
terms, the AP&P investigator wrote: 
[Defendant was in a position of trust and violated that trust when he seized 
what he said was an opportunity, and sexually abused his four-year-old niece 
and five-year-old niece. He was brazen in his behavior because both assaults 
occurred when there were other people in the home and after one of the sexual 
assaults, he returned to where the rest of the family were and played with the 
victim as if nothing had happened. . . . Despite his claims, [that] he has not 
sexually abused anyone for 10 years, one is inclined to believe there are other 
victims who have not come forward. Even if there were not, he has started 
sexually abusing children again and it is a concern that as he has gotten older, 
his victims have not. There is no doubt there will be more victims if he is not 
removed from the community for a long period of time and placed into 
treatment. 
(R552. 62A:2). 
At the sentencing hearing, the court noted that it had received and reviewed the PSI 
(R552. 64:1). Defense counsel recommended concurrent sentences and pointed out that 
defendant was young, had good attitude, and was amenable to treatment (R552. 64:2). The 
State recommended only that the court follow the recommendations of the PSI (R552.64:3). 
The court gave its opinion that defendant's crimes were "repulsive" and "reprehensible," that 
defendant had engaged in a "pattern of activity" and "violated the trust of these small four 
and five-year-old girls" (R552. 64:3) The court concluded that defendant was "a danger to 
society" and "must be placed in a confined setting so that [he] cannot prey on small children 
in this society anymore" (R552. 64:3-4). The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive 
one-to-fifteen year prison terms and recommended that defendant receive sex-offender 
therapy in prison (R552. 45-46, 64:3; R394. 44-45). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial courts have wide sentencing discretion. While they must consider all legally 
relevant factors, they need not make a record of their consideration of those factors unless 
required by statute. Where the court is not required to and does not make a record of its 
consideration of the legally relevant factors, a reviewing court may assume that the court 
considered those factors. In such a case, the reviewing court will overturn the sentence only 
if the sentence is inherently unfair or clearly excessive. 
In the instant case, the sentencing court was not required and did not make a record of 
its consideration of the factors. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the court 
considered all the legally relevant factors because the PSI, which the court stated it read, 
contained all the information the court needed to consider those factors. The actual sentence 
permits the Board of Pardons and Parole to parole defendant from two second degree 
felonies after only two years. The sentence is therefore not inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's sole claim is that the sentencing court abused it's discretion when it 
ordered him to serve his prison terms consecutively. Aplt. Br. at 10. Specifically, defendant 
asserts that the court failed to adequately weigh all relevant mitigating factors, including 
defendant's extreme remorse for his actions, his significant rehabilitative needs, and a 
psychologist's opinion that defendant was fit for pre-trial release. Aplt. Br. at 12-15. 
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THE SENTENCING COURT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE CONSIDERED 
THE LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS WHERE THE COURT READ 
THE PSI AND IMPOSED A SENTENCE THAT IS NOT INHERENTLY 
UNFAIR OR CLEARLY EXCESSIVE 
District courts have "wide latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Helms, 2002 
UT 12, H 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)). 
"Generally, [appellate courts] will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an 
abuse of the judge's discretion." Id. "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, 
among other things, it 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors'" Id. (quoting State v. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990)). A sentencing court is not required, however, 
to state on the record its consideration of each legally relevant factor. See Helms, 2002 UT 
12, If 11. Rather, this Court may assume that the sentencing court actually considered the 
factors unless (1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute 
explicitly provides that written findings must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings 
on an issue must be made. See id.; State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997). 
When a court is not required to make a record of its consideration of the legally relevant 
factors, the sentence will be overturned "only when it is inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14. 
In the instant case, the sentencing court ordered defendant to serve his sentences 
consecutively (R552.45-46,64:3; R394.44-45). "In determining whether state offenses are 
to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and history, character and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). No statute or case required the court to 
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make a record of its consideration of those factors. The court concluded on the record at the 
sentencing hearing only that the gravity and pattern of defendant's crimes rendered him a 
"danger to society" (R552. 64:3-4). This Court may therefore assume that the trial court 
considered all the legally relevant factors. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tf 11. Such an 
assumption is reasonable. The court noted on the record that it had reviewed the PSI (R552. 
64:1). The PSI contained everything the court needed to "consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Specifically, the PSI 
included an official summary of the offenses, defendant's version of the offenses, 
defendant's criminal history including his juvenile record, defendant's personal history 
including his family history, sexual history, and sexual treatment history, and an evaluative 
assessment by the AP&P investigator (R552. 62A). 
Defendant claims that "simply being aware of sentencing information is not enough." 
Aplt. Br. at 12. "The sentencing judge must actually 'take[e] [the information] into 
account.'" Aplt. Br. at 12 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1300 (Utah 1993)). However, where the trial court is not required to make a record of its 
consideration of the legally relevant factors, and it does not actually make such a record, this 
Court assumes the trial court considered all the relevant factors unless the sentence is 
"inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  11, 14. 
In support of his claim defendant relies on State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989), 
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and State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). Those cases all, however, involved 
circumstances where Utah law required the sentencing court to make a record of its 
consideration of each legally relevant factor or where the court was not required to make a 
record, but did. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 15 (distinguishing Galli because the courts in 
Galli provided a detailed written explanation for the sentences they imposed); Strunk,846 
P.2d at 1299 (noting that Utah statutory law requires court to make record of its reasons for 
imposing minimum mandatory sentences for child kidnapping); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d at 
1136 (noting that court discussed each of the legally relevant factors and discussed 
defendant's compliance); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d at 118-19 (noting that sentencing court 
stated on record at hearing what evidence it considered and how it weighed the evidence). 
The instant case is more analogous to State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12. In that case, 
Helms pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault and three counts of dealing in 
harmful material to a minor. Id. at f^ 1. The court sentenced Helms to two prison terms of 
three years to life for the aggravated sexual assault counts and three prison terms of zero to 
five years for the dealing in harmful material to a minor counts. Id. The court ordered the 
sentences to run consecutively. Id. In imposing the sentences and ordering them to run 
consecutively, the court stated only (1) that it had reviewed the PSI and a letter from Helms' 
sister and (2) that defendant's actions were "completely outside the realm of a normal 
situation." Id. at ]f 6. On review, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the record contained no 
explanation of the trial court's weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 
Id. at ffl[ 12, 15. The court held that it "must therefore defer to the trial court's judgment 
9 
absent a showing by [Helms] that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors/' 
A/, at K 15. 
As in Helms, the record here contains no explanation of the trial court's weighing of 
the aggravating and mitigating factors (R552. 64:3-4). The trial court stated only that 
defendant's crimes were "reprehensible" and that defendant needed to be "placed in a 
confined setting" (R552. 64:3-4). This Court must therefore assume that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion unless defendant's sentence is "inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^  14. 
Defendant points out several mitigating factors including his candor with 
investigators, his remorse and empathy for the victims, his youth, his willingness to undergo 
treatment, and his rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 13-15. He claims the court ignored these 
factors and focused only on the seriousness of the crime. Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant's claim 
ignores the wide discretion courts have in sentencing. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8. 
"Generally, [appellate courts] will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an 
abuse of the judge's discretion." Id. There is no evidence that the court ignored the 
mitigating factors—it simply was unpersuaded by them. Thus, unless the sentence is 
"inherently unfair or clearly excessive," this Court must affirm defendant's sentence. Id. at ^  
14. 
Defendant asserts that consecutive sentences have "doom[ed] [him] to lengthy 
incarceration with little hope of timely addressing the causes of his criminal conduct." Aplt. 
Br. at 18. In fact, the consecutive sentencing order only changed defendant's minimum 
10 
sentence from one year to two. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(8).4 The order thus gives 
the Board of Pardons substantial discretion to release defendant in as early as two years or, if 
defendant proves averse to reform and a continuing danger to society, to continue his 
confinement for up to thirty years. Defendant's sentence is not, therefore, "inherently unfair 
or clearly excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, U 14. Defendant began sexually abusing younger 
children at a very early age (R552. 62A:2, 10). The abuse appears to have continued though 
his teenage years (R552. 62A:7-10). While there may have been a period of remission, 
defendant has began abusing young children again (R552. 62A:3-6). Both the prosecutor 
and AP&P concluded that defendant needed to be incarcerated and treated (R552. 62A:2, 7) 
Consecutive sentences provide a just punishment with flexibility to accommodate 
defendant's response to treatment and ability to change. 
Defendant claims that the sentencing court "failed to consider the psychologist's 
evaluation of Mr. Lehman's fitness for pre-trial release." Aplt. Br. at 12. No statute or case 
4
 Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(8) explains how to calculate consecutively imposed 
sentences and reads, in part: 
[T]he Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has 
been committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms 
Thus, defendant will serve his two one-to-fifteen year prison terms as if he had 
been sentenced to a single term of two-to-thirty years. 
11 
requires a sentencing court to consider such a report. The report's summary conclusions of 
defendant's character and history are repetitive of what is contained in the PSI (R552. 23-
24). The psychologist's recommendation of supervised release is inapplicable because it was 
made before defendant confessed to sexually abusing two small girls and without 
consideration of defendant's juvenile record (R552. 23-24). In short, the report is not, as 
defendant claims, a mitigating factor because it contains the same information as the PSI, 
with less detail, and the psychologist's recommendation was made without consideration of 
all the facts. 
Defendant's claim is therefore meritless. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this l& day of February 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
• & = > 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 8 day of February 2004,1 served four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Kyle Joseph Lehman, by causing 
them to be delivered by first class mail to Kent Hart, his counsel of record, at Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Ass'n, 424 East 500 South, Ste. 300, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Matthew D. Bates 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consec-
utively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record tha t consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
